Beyond Hillary and Benazir: Women’s Political Leadership Worldwide

Farida Jalalzai and Mona Lena Krook

Abstract
Women have recently made dramatic gains in electoral politics, winning a number of high profile positions of national leadership and a record number of seats in parliaments around the world. This article surveys and analyzes these developments, seeking to understand why women’s representation has increased in some countries but not in others, as well as what these patterns indicate about changes in the status of women in political life. It concludes with some reflections on the gendered nature of the public sphere and what these shifts might mean for women as a group.

Keywords
Representation, Public sphere, Women political leaders, Gender and politics

Introduction
In recent times, the status of women in politics has captured the imagination of spectators around the world. In early 2008, much of this attention was focused on two women in particular: Hillary Rodham Clinton, the former First Lady running to become the first female president of the United States, and Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister of Pakistan assassinated following a campaign rally in December 2007. This follows on from interest in the election of other female leaders around the globe, like Angela Merkel in Germany, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in Liberia, and Pratibha Patil in India, and coincides with the election of record numbers of women to national parliaments worldwide (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009b). Such developments have sparked widespread discussion as to the role of sex and gender in political life. For some, the rise of several prominent female leaders reflects the important gains that women as a group have made in the political sphere. For others, however, the experiences and por¬trayals of female politicians, as well as the continued under-representation of women in politics more generally, draw attention to the many ways in which access to political office is still very much stratified by gender. These debates raise several questions: What is the status of women in politics today? What explains the increased election of women in some countries but not in others? Finally, what do these developments mean for women as a group?
In this article, we address these questions by analyzing and comparing women in positions of executive and legislative leadership around the globe. Doing so requires that we first distinguish “sex” from “gender”: while sex captures biological differences between women and men, gender refers to the social meanings given to these differ¬ences, which may vary both cross-culturally and over time. In most countries, norms of gender have traditionally prescribed distinct roles in society for the two sexes: men have been given primary responsibility for affairs in the public sphere, like politics and the economy, while women have been assigned a central position in the private sphere, namely the home and the family (Elshtain, 1981). Historically, the public–private divide served as an argument against women’s right to vote, on the grounds that suffrage for women would disturb the balance between the public and private spheres (Pateman, 1994). While it has been muted over time, this divide continues to manifest itself to the present day, albeit in different ways across cultural contexts, through elite and media scrutiny of the husbands and children of female aspirants, as well as largely unsubstanti¬ated concerns about the broader “qualifications” of female candidates. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that women constitute a relatively small proportion of elected officials worldwide, at the same time that increases in their numbers may portend signifi¬cant shifts in the gendered nature of the public sphere.
To explore the degree to which the public–private divide has been reconfigured in recent years, we begin in the first section by providing an overview of the women who have served as presidents and prime ministers. Presenting some descriptive data, we outline several of the main explanations typically given to account for the rise of women in these contexts, especially in places where women do not otherwise enjoy a high social or economic status. In the second section, we turn to the state of women in national par¬liaments. After noting some general trends, we review a range of intuitions regarding the factors that shape women’s access to legislative office. We evaluate these two sets of arguments in the third section, where we point to two other patterns that, we argue, shed greater light on why women have been able to achieve high political positions in some countries but not in others. Tying these to efforts to rethink the public–private divide, we conclude with some thoughts as to the status of women in world politics today and the broader meanings of these developments for women as a group.

Women as National Leaders
Historically, female national leaders have been rare (Jackson, 1990). The first woman to enter a position of national leadership who was not a monarch was Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who became prime minister of Sri Lanka in 1960. Later in the same decade, two otherprominent women, Indira Gandhi of India and Golda Meir of Israel, also rose to power as prime ministers. However, it was not until 1974 that Isabel Perón of Argentina became the first female president. In general, the progress in the early decades was slow: three women became national leaders in the 1960s, followed by six in the 1970s, and seven in the 1980s. In contrast, dramatic change began to occur in more recent decades: 26 women first obtained positions of top executive leadership in the 1990s, followed by 29 addi¬tional women through August 2009. In other words, the number of new female leaders nearly quadrupled between the 1980s and 1990s and this pattern was repeated again in the 2000s. As such, more than three-quarters of all female presidents and prime ministers have come to office in the years since 1990. These findings indicate that the growing number of women in executive posts is no illusion or artifact of media coverage; rather, more women are entering these positions than ever before.
In total, 71 women from 52 countries have joined the elite ranks of female national leaders between 1960 and 2009 (see Table 1). This figure includes those women who have served on a temporary basis, for example as acting or interim leaders. However, it excludes those who have occupied positions that do not conform to presidential or prime ministerial office and in countries that are not politically autonomous.1 This overview reveals that these women in positions of executive leadership hail from geographically diverse locations. While the largest proportion is from Europe, other world regions also have large numbers of female leaders. Presently, 16 of these women occupy political office: nine presidents and seven prime ministers (see Table 2).2 Together, they head countries in five regions: Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Oceania.
To date, most research on female national leaders has focused on the details of indi¬vidual women’s political careers (Genovese, 1993; Liswood, 1995; Opfell, 1993). As such, comparative work on this topic is relatively sparse. Reviewing the literature, how¬ever, it is possible to make several observations with regard to these women’s paths to power. What is perhaps most striking is that, contrary to many expectations, women have tended to become presidents and prime ministers in contexts where women’s status lags far behind that of men in the educational and economic spheres, and in places where women face numerous constraints on their political and social participation. In fact, the only quantitative study on this topic finds a correlation between the presence of a female head of state or government and lower levels of parity of women to men in life expec-tancy, education, and income (Jalalzai, 2008).3 Yet, at the same time, the women who accede to these positions are usually highly educated and considerably more privileged than women in the general population (Jalalzai, 2004). Consequently, it is simplistic to assert that the education and economic status of women are not relevant to their political advancement. It is crucial for those who eventually rise to positions of national promi¬nence, but this can be – and has been – achieved where women’s overall status is low.
Attempts to reconcile the paradox of female leaders in contexts in which women gen¬erally lack power have pointed to the importance of kinship ties as a path to office (Hodson, 1997; Richter, 1991). Women’s leadership in certain regions is largely limited to those with familial ties through marriage or blood connections to former executives or opposition leaders, many of whom were assassinated. In these cases, kinship ties areprimary but gender continues to be salient to these women’s election or appointment to office. There are compelling reasons why a woman may appear to be a more appropriate heir to political power. For example, a woman may not be seen as independently politi¬cally ambitious and therefore as easily pushed aside by male leaders after coming to office (Col, 1993). Alternatively, because women are often viewed as unifiers of the fam¬ily, they may be charged with the daunting task of uniting their country following a period of political conflict (Saint-Germain, 1993).
Providing unity is especially important given that a contributing factor to women’s rule in many of these contexts is high levels of political instability and a lack of political institutionalization, benefiting select women in their pursuit of power (Jalalzai, 2008). In some instances, independence causes various ethnic and religious factions suppressed during colonialism to become salient. This leads to frequent regime change, stemming from assassinations and repeated coups (Hodson, 1997). These circumstances create more opportunities to gain access to executive posts than would normally be the case. The lack of institutional development that is associated with such turbulence allows for kinship, ethnicity, or charismatic leadership to play a greater role in politics, opening the way for some women to occupy leadership posts. Exactly how these patterns interact with political institutions, however, is not yet well understood.
At the same time, institutional features of the political system appear to be critical to women’s executive advancement. In general, women are more likely to serve in parlia¬mentary systems and more often as prime ministers than as presidents: there have been 40 female prime ministers and 31 female presidents. Some studies attribute the greater success of women in obtaining prime ministerial posts to their ability to bypass a poten¬tially biased general public and be chosen by the party as parliamentary rules dictate (Whicker and Isaacs, 1999). Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom and Angela Merkel of Germany are good examples of women rising to power through party promo¬tion (Clemens, 2006; King, 2002). This is different from the processes involved in becoming president within a presidential system, which typically relies on some sort of popular vote for ascension. Presidential and prime ministerial posts also differ in their authority, autonomy, and traits deemed necessary for success, all of which are shaped by notions of gender. More specifically, the fusion of executive and legislative authority within parliamentary systems features a prime minister who shares power with cabinet and party members. In these systems, collaboration is fundamental: the qualities neces¬sary for successfully formulating programs are negotiation, collaboration, and delibera¬tion, all typically considered more feminine. In contrast, presidents in presidential systems act independently of the legislature and generally are expected to lead in a quick and decisive manner, traits which are more often associated with masculinity (Duerst-Lahti, 1997; Jalalzai, 2008).

Women in National Parliaments
Women form a small minority of all parliamentarians worldwide. However, the current world average, 18 percent, is the highest proportion ever recorded (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009b). Attention to aggregate numbers nonetheless masks substantial variations across countries: while Rwanda and Sweden have nearly equal numbers of women andmen in their national legislatures, others, such as Belize and Saudi Arabia, have no women at all (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009a). Early research on these variations noted that the countries with the most women in elected positions tended to be countries where women enjoyed a relatively high social and economic status and cultural norms supported women’s political participation (Norris, 1987). Today, these patterns are less clear: while the countries in the world with the most women in politics in the late 1980s came from two recognizable groups, the Nordic region and the Communist bloc (United Nations Office at Vienna, 1992: 12), those that top this list in the late 2000s include some of these same states but also a wide range of other countries in Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Oceania (see Table 3). In comparison, several countries with long demo¬cratic histories, as well as high scores on indicators of women’s status, elect relatively few women, most notably the United Kingdom (19.5 percent), France (18.2 percent), and the United States (16.8 percent) (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009a).
Comparative literature on this topic stretches back more than twenty years. It identi¬fies three sets of factors shaping women’s access to national legislatures. The first relates to political institutions. Scholars have found that countries with proportional representa¬tion (PR) electoral systems tend to have a much higher share of women in parliament than countries with majoritarian electoral arrangements (McAllister and Studlar, 2002; Reynolds, 1999; Salmond, 2006). These disparities are explained by reference to the fact that PR systems often have higher district magnitudes, which open the way for women to be included as the total number of members per district increases, and closed party lists, which enable political parties to place women in electable positions on party slates (Caul, 1999). Combined, these factors appear to offer more opportunities for female candidates, because political parties may feel compelled to nominate at least a few women in order to balance their lists. These effects may be magnified by characteristics of political parties. The impact of district magnitude, for example, frequently depends upon party magnitude, or the number of seats that a party assumes that it will win in a particular district: parties expecting to win only a few seats are less likely to nominate women, while those that anticipate winning several seats are more likely to balance their tickets with some female candidates (Matland and Taylor, 1997). Ideology also matters: left-wing parties tend to nominate more women than right-wing parties,4 stemming from differences in their support for traditional gender roles, as well as their willingness to take concrete steps to promote women to top positions on electoral lists (Caul, 1999; Reynolds, 1999).
A second set of variables are social and economic. Initially, research found that wom¬en’s overall levels of education and labor force participation were closely correlated with levels of female parliamentary representation (McDonagh, 2002; Rosenbluth et al., 2006). As such, women rarely achieved the higher socioeconomic status that forms the “eligibility pool” for elective office, because practices of sex segregation in most coun¬tries channel women into female-dominated, low-paying occupations such as nursing and education and men into male-dominated, high-paying occupations like law and man¬agement. These patterns are anticipated to be less prevalent in countries at higher levels of socioeconomic development, where processes of modernization enable women to gain access to education and the paid labor force, thus moving them into higher-status social and economic roles, which in turn can lead to greater influence in politics (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). However, other work has cast doubt on these findings, uncovering weak and sometimes even negative correlations between women’s education and labor force participation and the proportion of women in elected office (Matland, 1998; Moore and Shackman, 1996). Some account for this by suggesting that improvements in wom¬en’s status may serve only as facilitating conditions. Others note that these factors may operate differently in developed versus developing countries: women’s participation in the labor force, for example, appears to have a positive effect on women’s representation in the former but no effect in the latter (Matland, 1998). Indeed, several developing coun¬tries have witnessed dramatic changes in the absence of these assumed developmental “prerequisites” (Bruhn, 2003; Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005).
A third and final group of explanations focus on cultural factors. Studies of the Nordic countries attribute the relatively high proportion of women in parliament in this region to a political culture that places strong emphasis on social and economic equality (Bystydzienski, 1995). Other scholars explore the impact of religion and find that Christian countries tend to have more women than countries with other dominant reli¬gions (Reynolds, 1999). These effects stem from the ways in which religion may inter¬sect with cultural prohibitions on women’s political activity, forbidding women from speaking in front of men, seeking political office, or attending political meetings(Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Tripp, 2001). These norms, of course, are rooted in the public–private divide, which plays a major role in socializing women and men into prescribed gender roles, calling into question the legitimacy of women’s political engagement and conferring private sphere responsibilities on women that prevent them from pursuing public office. These effects endure long after shifts in women’s social and economic status by negatively influencing women’s decisions to run (Lawless and Fox, 2005) as well as elites’ evaluations of potential female candidates (Kittilson, 2006; Niven, 1998). These beliefs are compounded by the media, which frequently draw on gender stereotypes in ways that appear to negatively affect women’s chances of getting elected (Kahn, 1996). Nonetheless, in some countries arguments making reference to women’s roles in the private sphere have served as powerful arguments for political inclu¬sion (Inhetveen, 1999). Furthermore, voter stereotypes may favor female candidates when feminine qualities are viewed as desirable at particular moments in time (Swers, 2002).

Gender and Routes to Political Office
Explanations of women’s entry into positions of executive and legislative leadership thus focus on a combination of social, economic, cultural, and political reasons for women’s inclusion and exclusion as political actors. While these trends are well established across many studies, recent developments afford a new view into the dynamics sustaining wom¬en’s inequality in the political sphere. As mentioned earlier, the number of female national leaders has grown dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s. This increase in sample size makes it possible to explore in greater depth some of the broader patterns in wom¬en’s access to higher political office, in terms of both the types of positions they tend to hold and their routes to power. Similarly, as intimated above, there have been dramatic shifts in patterns of female legislative representation in recent years. These coincide with the rapid diffusion of electoral gender quota policies across the globe in the 1990s and 2000s. Although many of these measures do not achieve their stated goals, variations in their impact shed further light on the factors explaining the low numbers of women in parliaments worldwide. Both sets of patterns, when viewed together, point to the extent to which gender norms continue to shape the conditions of women’s access to political office.
New Trends in Women’s National Leadership
Beginning with women’s executive representation, recent rises in the number of female national leaders present an opportunity to explore in greater depth the relations between gender and political institutions. The concept of gender is fundamentally concerned with questions of power, especially potential imbalances of power between women and men in various social, economic, and political contexts. In politics, power disparities across political offices can be understood as the degree to which political actors operate autono¬mously, are relatively secure from dismissal, and are able to control or exercise authority over various realms. If a position has lower levels of autonomy, security, and individual prerogatives, its institutional structure may pose fewer challenges to women coming to office. Prime ministers are typically more vulnerable than presidents in this regard: votesof no confidence, as well as elections, mean that prime ministers may in theory be ousted at any time. In contrast, presidents often serve fixed terms and generally possess greater protection from removal once in office. Female prime ministers may thus appear to pose less of a threat to existing gender dynamics than female presidents, explaining why women are less likely to be presidents than prime ministers.
All the same, the simple division between presidents and prime ministers made in a great deal of executive scholarship overlooks substantial variations in positions of national leadership. In particular, several countries integrate a president and prime min¬ister in a dual executive arrangement, where both actors share power to some extent. These systems generally mix elements of presidential and parliamentary structures but, crucially, vary in the autonomy, security, and authorities conferred to each position (Siaroff, 2003). In most instances, one executive is dominant over the other. Understanding these power differences is one key for evaluating women’s progress as national leaders (see Table 4). Restricting the analysis to women who have served on a non-temporary basis, it becomes clear that the majority – 34 of the 55 women overall, or 62 percent – have been prime ministers. Further, most female national leaders have secured their posi¬tion through legislative or presidential appointment; only 13 came to power initially through popular election.5 This number includes several presidents, who bypassed the public through succession or selection by legislatures.
Taking a closer look at the types of offices that women have held, it is striking to note that most female leaders – 37, or 67 percent – are from dual executive systems, therefore sharing power with another executive. Women thus serve more often in systems where executive authority is more dispersed, as opposed to in those with more unified executive structures. Furthermore, in most of these cases, women tend to be placed in positions of weaker authority.6 Several of the female presidents elected by the public, for example, hold relatively nominal positions, serving mainly as figureheads. As such, Mary McAleese of Ireland has very little substantive power as compared to the prime minis¬ter. In other instances, female presidents bypass the public because they are elected by legislatures or replace male presidents from the position of vice-president. In addition to this, there are numerous examples of weak female prime ministers operating under much stronger presidents. This is typically the case for women in Africa, who are often unilat¬erally appointed by the president and frequently subject to dismissal at his will. The same is true of several female leaders in Eastern Europe. Consequently, not all national leader¬ship posts are created equal. The fact that women have increased their numbers as execu¬tives is important. However, the specific powers and level of autonomy at their disposal are crucial in assessing how far they have come (Jalalzai, 2008).
Nevertheless, a substantial number of women have recently risen to important posi¬tions where their power is unchallenged by another executive. This is the case for several prime ministers in unified parliamentary systems, as well as for the few female presi¬dents elected directly by the public in presidential systems. Interestingly, most of these women serve as presidents in Latin America and South and Southeast Asia, where wom¬en’s education, economic, and political status lags behind that of men. In contrast to other regions, working their way up the party ranks is not the dominant path to power for women in these countries. These patterns can instead be explained in terms of familial ties. As previously noted, the reliance on marital or blood connections of women inpolitics in these parts of the world is not new. However, it has clearly not ceased. In fact, no woman holding dominant executive power in Latin America or Asia has ever come to power without familial connections.7 Moreover, popular election appears to be limited to women from political families. However, recent examples suggest more variation than previously thought. Most notably, even women with family ties tend to have more political experience than they are generally credited with by the public. Michelle Bachelet of Chile and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of the Philippines held cabinet positions, for example, while Indira Gandhi and Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia were legislators. Furthermore, not all wives followed their husbands into politics; some were politically active figures in their own right. Janet Jagan had been a party founder and a member of parliament since 1953, before becoming president of Guyana in 1997 after her husband President Cheddi Bharat Jagan’s death. Similarly, Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner held a national governmental office, while her husband Néstor Carlos Kirchner never did before he became president. She is also the only woman with familial ties to come to power while her male connection was still alive. All of this suggests that women with family connections are not a monolith. Indeed, their victories are seldom a foregone conclusion: they often face significant opposition from various male elites, as well as competition from other family members.8
It is important to recognize that women are not the only ones benefiting from family connections. First, many political dynasties do not even include women. Second, in countries where women have ruled, including Nicaragua, Panama, and Sri Lanka, male family members may later come to power. Thus while political dynasties originate with male family members, female leaders may in turn help propel members of their own immediate families into power, either directly or indirectly through the family name. This was the case for Indira Gandhi’s son Rajiv Gandhi, who served as prime minister of India from 1984 to 1989; her daughter-in-law Sonia Gandhi, who has led the Congress Party since 1998; and her grandson Rahul Gandhi, who has been a mem¬ber of parliament since 2004. Sri Lanka’s former president Chandrika Kumaratunga was aided not just by her ties to her father, former prime minister Solomon Bandaranaike, but also by those to her mother, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who served as prime minister. Later down the road, blood ties to Kumaratunga were pivotal in turn to her mother becoming prime minister for a third term in 1994. Most recently, Benazir Bhutto’s husband, Asif Zardari, assumed command of the Pakistani People’s Party after her assassination. Zardari is now president and holds a more powerful and secure position than Bhutto was able to achieve as prime minister.
Political instability and lack of political institutionalization also continue to be relevant for women’s ascension to national leadership posts. While these dynamics often work in tandem with familial ties in Asia and Latin America, the latter do not appear to be prevalent in other regions of the world. However, with the exception of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia, female executives in Africa tend to be rele¬gated to less powerful positions in systems dominated by male presidents. In addi¬tion, political change may also work in another way. Of the 71 women who have been national leaders, 16 have served on an interim or transitional basis: 10 as presidents and 6 as prime ministers. The majority of these were appointed by tem¬porary ruling coalitions, legislatures, or presidents during moments of political transition. Sabine Bergmann-Pohl, as president of the first and only popularly elected East German parliament, aided the reunification of Germany. Others are charged with overseeing new elections: Lidia Gueiler Tejada of Bolivia and ErthaPascal-Trouillot of Haiti after military coups and Nino Burdzhanadze of Georgia following rigged elections.
Cases like Burdzhanadze’s also illustrate the importance of moving up through con¬stitutional provisions. As Georgia’s speaker of parliament, she was constitutionally certi¬fied acting president when Eduard Shevardnadze resigned. However, such openings do not always guarantee succession. Rosalía Arteaga, as vice-president of Ecuador, seemed to be the appropriate successor to President Abdalá Bucaram, who was deemed unfit to stay in office. However, the line of succession was not clearly constitutionally estab¬lished and Arteaga had to battle with the leader of Congress, Fabián Alarcón, for the position. Though she was successfully sworn in as president, she resigned within three days, succumbing to army and congressional pressure. Several other women in dual executive systems were appointed by presidents upon the dismissal or resignation of the current prime minister and stayed on temporarily until new selections were made. Temporary appointments are therefore an important route to office for women since they are able to bypass traditional mechanisms. The transitory nature of their leadership appears to be less threatening, and thus less of a challenge to the masculine norms of leadership. In fact, women aiding in times of electoral transformation may be viewed positively precisely because they are women and, as such, not seen as tainted with their own political ambitions; they are expected to return to their previous positions once elec¬tions are held.

Recent Trends in Women’s Access to National Parliaments
Turning to women’s legislative representation, it has already been observed that the top countries in the world in this regard have become an incredibly diverse group over the last several years. These shifts suggest that barriers to women’s access may have become de-gendered to some extent, at least in some countries. A key factor driving this change has been the adoption of gender quotas aimed at increasing the numbers of women selected and elected as candidates to political office. Among the 20 countries listed in Table 3, 15 use formal quota policies, 4 employ informal policies,9 and 1 previously had a quota policy. For example, the constitution approved in Rwanda in 2003 reserves one-third of all seats in the lower house for women; a 30 percent quota applies to the upper house. In Sweden since the 1990s nearly all political parties have had formal or informal policies of alternation, meaning that they include women in every other position on their party lists. In Argentina the electoral law states that all parties must nominate 30 percent women in positions which make their election possible. In contrast, New Zealand does not have a formal quota, but the New Zealand Labour Party has a policy of “pausing for thought” to take gender balance into account when composing its lists of candidates. Finally, three parties in Denmark – two of which still exist – used to have gender quotas but repealed these in the early 1990s (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Krook et al., 2009).10
The presence of quotas extends beyond this group of countries, however. Indeed, par¬ties and national legislatures in more than 100 countries have now adopted some type of quota, most within the last 15 years. These measures take three broad forms: reserved seats, which set aside seats for women that men are not eligible to contest; party quotas, which involve voluntary commitments by parties to include a proportion of womenamong their candidates; and legislative quotas, which require all parties to nominate a certain percentage of women. These measures are distinct from other types of public policies, in the sense that they seek to influence who participates in policy-making itself. In seeking to explain the rapid diffusion of these measures, given the radical nature of the reforms, scholars have offered various accounts as to how and why they have been adopted. Most relate to political dynamics at the domestic level: the mobilization of women’s groups (Bruhn, 2003; Kittilson, 2006), the strategic incentives of political elites (Davidson-Schmich, 2006), and the “fit” between quotas and norms of equality and rep¬resentation (Opello, 2006). More recently, scholars have also explored international and transnational influences on quota adoption (Krook, 2006).
Interest in the spread of quotas, however, often masks the fact that many of these poli¬cies do not achieve their intended effects. Some policies, to be sure, produce dramatic increases in the numbers of women elected to political office. In Costa Rica, for example, a 40 percent quota law was adopted in 1996. Initially, the percentage of women in parlia¬ment increased from 14 percent in 1994 to only 19 percent in 1998. However, after the highest electoral court clarified that parties must include 40 percent women in “electable positions,” this proportion jumped to 35 percent in 2002 and 39 percent in 2006, drop¬ping to 37 percent in 2008 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009a; Jones, 2004). In contrast, quotas in other countries led to stagnation and even decreases in the proportion of female parliamentarians. In France, legislators amended the constitution in 1999 and the elec¬toral law in 2000 to mandate that parties nominate 50 percent male and female candi¬dates. Despite these reforms, women’s representation in parliament barely rose from 11 percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 2002 and 18 percent in 2007 (Krook, 2009). This is because the law does not specify the districts in which female candidates must be placed and imposes a financial penalty for non-compliance that creates distinct incentives for compliance from small parties who are under greater pressures than large parties to max¬imize the amount of state subsidy they receive. (Murray, 2004). In Brazil, a 20 percent quota was established in 1996 and raised to 25 percent in 1998 and 30 percent in 2000. At the same time, however, another regulation was passed allowing parties to present 50 percent more candidates than the seats available. This provision introduced a crucial “escape clause” for quota implementation. As a result, the number of women in parlia¬ment decreased, dropping from 6 percent in 1994 to 5 percent in 1998, although this figure later increased to 8 percent in 2002 and 9 percent in 2006 (Araújo, 2003; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009a).
One reason for these variations stems from the details of the quota policies them¬selves, in terms of their form, wording, requirements, sanctions, and perceived legiti¬macy (Schmidt and Saunders, 2004). A second relates to the “fit” between quotas and other political institutions. For example, many studies find that quotas have the greatest impact in PR electoral systems with closed lists and high district magnitudes (Htun and Jones, 2002), as well as in parties with left-wing ideologies where the party leadership is better able to enforce party or national regulations (Caul, 1999; Davidson-Schmich, 2006). A third and final explanation is that the effects of these measures depend on the balance of actors who support and oppose quota policies. Most accounts expose the ways in which elites seek to mitigate their impact, from passive refusal to enforce quotas to more active measures to subvert their intended effects. However, many also mentionother actors, including women’s organizations, national and international courts, and ordinary citizens, who may monitor party compliance in ways that lead elites to ignore or honor quota requirements (Araújo, 2003; Jones, 2004).
Patterns in quota adoption and implementation both challenge and reinforce some of the elements of the conventional wisdom on gender and political recruitment. One way to understand these dynamics is in terms of a sequential model of political recruitment, progressing from (1) the large number of citizens who are eligible to run for political office to (2) the smaller pool of citizens who aspire to run for political office to (3) the small group of citizens who are nominated to run for political office to (4) the smallest band of citizens who are elected to political office. In the absence of any mechanisms of distortion, the characteristics of the individuals present at each of these four stages should be roughly the same (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). To explain the relative absence of women, scholars have asked whether it stems from gender differences in political ambi¬tion, biases in the recruitment practices of political elites, or prejudices on the part of voters. The third possibility has been firmly debunked: most studies find that voters vote for women at equal or greater rates than men (Black and Erickson, 2003). Most subse¬quent work has thus focused on the relative role of supply- and demand-side factors in explaining why women are under-represented in electoral politics and how their repre¬sentation might be increased.
Emphasizing the strategic calculations of potential candidates suggests that women’s representation will not increase without significant shifts in the resources and motiva¬tions of women to wage effective political campaigns (Lawless and Fox, 2005). Once applicants come forward, however, their selection as candidates largely hinges on elite perceptions of their abilities, qualifications, and experience. While these evaluations are justified in terms of merit, substantial evidence indicates that elites discriminate against women and other non-dominant groups (Niven, 1998; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). Pointing to the importance of demand-side factors leads to quite different prescriptions for increasing the number of women in elected office. A key stimulus appears to be mobi¬lization in favor of gender quotas, whether party or legally based. The varied effects of quotas, however, reveal that while these policies may compel elites to recruit more female aspirants, their presence may not be enough to alter the dynamics of demand. All the same, the dramatic changes that have resulted in many countries following the intro¬duction of quotas clearly point to demand rather than supply as the main reason for the lack of higher numbers of women in political office around the world. Taken together, these patterns indicate a fundamental rethinking of the public–private divide in recent years, but suggest that the transformation – as yet – is far from complete.

Conclusions on Women in World Politics
Women have made dramatic gains in world politics in recent years. Although women still do not occupy half of all positions of executive and legislative leadership, a survey of global trends is encouraging: women appear to have shattered the political “glass ceiling” in countries with a diverse array of social, economic, cultural, and political characteristics. Further, these developments appear to have spilled over into other realms of political leadership. Most notably, there are now record numbers of women incabinets, 16 percent overall. Two countries have surpassed the 50 percent mark, Finland and Norway, and 22 countries have more than 30 percent female ministers. In addition, 28 women now serve as speakers of parliament, about half of these in Latin America and the Caribbean (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009b). At the same time, there appear to be important role model effects when it comes to female presidents and prime minis¬ters: 15 countries have had not just one female leader, but two different female leaders. This suggests that the presence of one woman in high political office may serve to break the strong association between masculinity and leadership. Obviously, this has not been the case in every country: for example, it has been nearly 20 years since Margaret Thatcher left office in the UK. However, combined with trends in many countries sug¬gesting that patterns of recruitment to national parliaments are beginning to be re-gen¬dered, these developments point to intriguing new possibilities with regard to women, gender, and politics.
The question remains, nonetheless, as to the broader meanings of these developments for women as a group. The lack of progress on several fronts, including the gendered conditions of women’s access, the experiences and portrayals of female politicians, and the far from equal levels of executive and legislative representation, reveals that politics is still largely viewed as a “man’s world.” Further, the women who reach top political positions do not always seek to promote women as a group. Leaders like Gandhi, Meir, and Thatcher invoked masculine styles of leadership and did not take steps to improve women’s status during their tenures in office.11 In contrast, others like Bachelet, Johnson-Sirleaf, and Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway actively recruited women to cabinet positions and have advocated women-friendly public policies. Similarly, the women who achieve seats in parliament through gender quotas express varying degrees of commit¬ment to women’s issues. While some introduce a broad range of proposals aimed at help¬ing women (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008), others are constrained actively by the male leaders who appoint them (Goetz and Hassim, 2003) or more indirectly by self-imposed concerns to avoid being marginalized in parliament by focusing only on a “narrow” set of issues related to women (Childs, 2004). These patterns indicate that gendered power dynamics are still very much at work in the political sphere, offering an important cor¬rective to naïve optimism regarding the gains that women have made. Indeed, several months after their victories seemed assured, Benazir Bhutto had been assassinated and Hillary Clinton had dropped out of the presidential race. Women’s progress in the politi¬cal sphere is thus in flux, with few guarantees regarding their future success.
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this article was awarded the Women’s Caucus Prize for Best Paper on Women and Politics from the Northeastern Political Science Association in 2009. We would like to thank panel participants and the anonymous reviewers at the International Political Science Review for their helpful comments in assisting us to revise this article.

Notes
1. These include offices like the Governor General of Antigua and Barbuda, Premier of the Åland islands in Finland, and Captain Regent of San Marino. For more details on the women who occupy these types of offices, see http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Current-Women-Leaders.htm (accessed May 20 2008).
2. Because of the Federation of Bosnia’s non-traditional and complex governmental structure, its president, Borjana Kristo, is excluded from this list. Bosnia has multiple executive entities including a three-person presidency, with rotating chief executives. Kristo is not part of this collective but is president of another executive system within Bosnia. This makes it difficult to compare to other systems.
3. This is based on analysis of the United Nations Development Program’s Gender-Related Development Index.
4. A growing number of right-wing parties, especially in Western Europe, have begun to close this gap through the increased recruitment of female candidates (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993).
5. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of the Philippines won a subsequent term through popular vote.
6. Several powers are examined, including veto, discretionary appointments, ability to dissolve the legislature, having a central role in government formation, foreign policy influence (including defense), long-term emergency powers, and chairing cabinet meetings. These are determined by both constitutional provisions and powers exercised in practice (Jalalzai, 2008).
7. This excludes those holding power only on an interim basis. Michelle Bachelet’s father, though never elected president of Chile, was a major opposition force and former air force general. She is thus counted here as having familial ties to political office.
8. See Hodson (1997) regarding competition within South Asian political families.
9. Krook et al. (2009) label these measures “soft quotas.”
10. For more details on individual policies, see http://www.quotaproject.org.
11. For case studies, see Genovese (1993).

Keganasan Komunis di SITC dan Tanjong Malim

Kini perdebatan tentang komunis dan komunisme kembali mendapat tempat dalam media arus perdana negara. Perkara ini dihangatkan lagi setelah Ketua Umum PKR, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim mengesa kerajaan Malaysia supaya membenarkan Chin Peng kembali ke Malaysia atas dasar kemanusiaan. Ramai yang menentang atau tidak bersetuju Chin Peng kembali ke Malaysia setelah rayuan terakhirnya di mahkamah tidak membuahkan hasil. Tidak kurang pula yang bersimpati dan mudah melupai kekejamannya di masa silam, lantas sudi memaafkan kesalahannya. Ada juga rakyat yang buta sejarah dan menggangap komunis sebagai pejuang negara! Benarkah begitu?
Bukankah komunis berjuang semata-mata untuk mendapatkan kuasa melalui kekerasan dan menegakkan ideologi komunisme? Mereka sebenarnya terpengaruh dengan ideologi Marxist di Russia dan Maoist di China yang mendapat kuasa melalui revolusi kaum buruh dan petani. Mereka kemudiannya menggerakkan revolusi dan mengganas, terutamanya di kampung-kampung menyebabkan ribuan orang awam dan anggota pasukan keselamatan terbunuh. Tak terkira harta benda dan tanaman dimusnahkan sebagai tindak balas kepada pihak yang tidak menyokong perjuangan mereka, sehingga kerajaan terpaksa mengisytiharkan darurat pada tahun 1948 hingga 1960. Ini semua angkara Chin Peng dan rakan-rakannya yang melancarkan perang gerila dari hutan pada Jun 1948 sehingga peletakan senjata mereka pada Disember 1989.
Tulisan ini bertujuan mengimbau kembali sejarah darurat yang berlaku dalam tahun 1948 hingga 1960 selama 12 tahun, yang memberi kesan kepada kehidupan pelajar-pelajar Sultan Idris Training College atau SITC (kini Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris) dan masyarakat Tanjong Malim. Semasa darurat, Tanjong Malim dan kawasan sekitarnya menjadi sarang pengganas komunis. Boleh dikatakan hampir setiap hari berlaku sahaja kejahatan atau kekejaman komunis. Misalnya ugutan terhadap penuntut-penuntut SITC dan penduduk Tanjong Malim, membakar bas kepunyaan syarikat pengangkutan di situ, tembak menembak di kampung antara pasukan keselamatan dengan pengganas, letupan bom di depoh minyak kepunyaan syarikat bas Mogah, serangan ke atas pasukan polis Tanjong Malim, serangan bom mortar di kawasan SITC dan lain-lain lagi.
Tidak jauh dari kawasan SITC iaitu arah ke utara (jalan lama) terdapat satu selekoh berdekatan dengan Kampung Simpang Ampat. Di kiri kanan jalan ke selekoh itu terdapat bukit dan di kaki bukit tersebut terdapat denai-denai yang menjadi tempat laluan pengganas komuis yang bergerak dari utara ke selatan. Mengikut cerita daripada bekas-bekas pelajar SITC, mereka pernah terserempak dengan pengganas komunis menyeberang di situ. Pengganas-pengganas komunis itu biasanya berpakaian seragam pasukan bintang tiga. Mereka selalunya bergerak dalam kumpulan tiga hingga sepuluh orang satu kumpulan.
Bagi menjaga keselamatan pelajar-pelajar di SITC, Polis Khas yang dikenali sebagai SC (Special Constable) ditempatkan di situ. SC yang bertugas di situ hanya beberapa orang sahaja. Mereka dibantu oleh pasukan Home Guard yang terdiri daripada penuntut-penuntut atau kakitangan SITC dan juga orang-orang kampung. Mereka dibekalkan dengan senjata dan diberi latihan kawad dan menembak. Salah sebuah daripada setor kepunyaan SITC dijadikan tempat menyimpan senjata dan sebuah pondok pengawal didirikan berdekatan dengan setor tersebut.
Arah ke dalam sedikit dari pondok pengawal SITC itu ada sebuah perkampungan Melayu iaitu Kampung Simpang Ampat yang sering berlaku kekejaman oleh pihak komunis. Pada 2 April 1951, jam 3.15 pagi, sekumpulan pengganas komunis seramai 20 orang telah menyerang dan membunuh dua orang pengawal SITC. Pengganas komunis tersebut telah memaksa pengawal berkenaan supaya menyerahkan senjata mereka, tetapi mereka enggan lalu mereka ditembak mati. Senjata dan jam tangan mereka telah dirampas termasuk sebentuk cincin emas kepunyaan pengawal tersebut.
Satu ketika lain pula, pada waktu malam, ketika penuntut-penuntut SITC sedang menonton wayang gambar di bilik senaman (kini Galeri Seni UPSI), pengganas-pengganas komunis telah menembak pondok pengawal SC yang sedang berkawal, tetapi tembakan tersebut terkena bilik projektor maktab. Apabila mendengar bunyi tembakan itu, penuntut-penuntut yang sedang asyik menonton tayangan gambar Inggeris telah lari bertempiaran menyelamatkan diri masing-masing dan ada yang meniarap ke lantai. Tayangan pada malam itu telah dibatalkan dan penuntut-penuntut kemudiannya dinasihati pulang ke asrama masing-masing.
Walaupun serangan pada malam itu tidak mengakibatkan sebarang kemalangan jiwa, cuma satu kerosakan kecil berlaku pada dinding panggung wayang tersebut, namun penuntut-penuntut SITC telah mengalami trauma dan belajar dalam ketakutan.
Pekan Tanjong Malim mempunyai kira-kira 20,000 orang penduduk yang majoritinya terdiri daripada orang-orang Cina. Kedudukan SITC pula tidak berapa jauh dari Balai Polis Tanjong Malim. Oleh kerana hendak mengelak daripada diketahui oleh pihak polis, pengganas-pengganas komunis selalunya bertindak pantas dan terus melarikan diri ke dalam hutan yang berhampiran.
Pada suatu ketika yang lain pula, saluran paip air yang membekalkan air kepada penuntut-penuntut SITC dan penduduk sekitar Tanjong Malim telah dirosakkan oleh sekumpulan pengganas komunis. Saluran paip air yang dirosakkan itu terletak dalam sebuah kebun getah di belakang SITC. Sebenarnya saluran paip dari takungan yang letaknya lebih kurang 3.22 KM (2 batu) di atas bukit telah dipotong lima kali oleh pengganas komunis. Pada 24 Mac 1952, pengganas komunis memutuskannya buat kali ke enam. Pada kira-kira jam 7.00 pagi hari Selasa, pada 25 Mac 1952, sekumpulan pegawal dan kakitangan yang membaiki saluran paip air telah masuk ke kebun getah itu untuk menjalankan tugas. Belumpun sempat kerja membaiki dimulakan, mereka telah diserang hendap oleh sekumpulan pengganas komunis yang dianggarkan seramai 20 hingga 30 orang.
Penuntut-penuntut SITC pula ketika itu terpaksa mandi dan membersihkan diri di sungai Bernam sebelum bekalan air dapat dipulihkan. Ketika perjalanan ke tempat mandi, terdengar bunyi tembakan beberapa kali datang dari arah kebun getah bersebelahan sungai Bernam. Tuan Haji Zainal Abidin bin Mohd Ali yang menjadi Timbalan Pengetua SITC pada masa itu segera datang dan memerintahkan penuntut-penuntut yang tercengang-cengang kerana tidak mengetahui puncanya supaya segera beredar dari situ untuk menyelamatkan diri.
Lebih kurang jam 11.00 pagi, barulah diketahui bahawa sejumlah 12 orang pengawal dan kakitangan yang ditugaskan untuk membaiki saluran paip telah terkorban ditembak pengganas komunis. Hanya seorang yang terselamat kerana berpura-pura mati dan berjaya melarikan diri ke Balai Polis Tanjong Malim untuk meminta bantuan. Mayat-mayat yang terdiri daripada pengawal dan orang awam yang terkorban itu dikumpulkan di hadapan Pejabat Daerah sebelum dihantar ke Pusat Kesihatan Tanjong Malim.
Di antara yang terkorban termasuk dua orang pegawai Inggeris iaitu Penolong Pegawai Daerah Tanjong Malim bernama Michael Codner dan seorang Jurutera Eksekutif benama W.H. Fourniss. Tujuh daripada mangsa itu ialah pengawal daripada pasukan polis hutan, manakala tiga mangsa yang lain ialah pekerja Teoh Eng Kiew, Penolong Teknikal Ahmad bin Jali dan Lanskoperal Polis Hamid bin Johari.
Sebagai tanda menghormati mangsa keganasan komunis itu, kedai di Tanjong Malim ditutup sepanjang hari pada hari kejadian. Penuntut-penuntut dan penduduk Tanjong Malim terkejut dengan kejadian itu, tetapi mereka juga takut kepada pengganas komunis.
Peristiwa yang memeranjatkan ini telah menyebabkan General Sir Gerald Templer yang pada ketika itu menjadi Pesuruhjaya Tinggi British di Tanah Melayu bertindak pantas. Beliau telah datang ke SITC Tanjong Malim iaitu pada 27 Mac 1952 dengan menaiki sebuah kereta perisai dari Kuala Kubu.
Pada sebelah pagi berikutnya, semasa penuntut-penuntut sedang beratur masuk ke kelas, mereka telah diarah supaya memasuki ke Dewan Besar (kini Dewan Suluh Budiman). Ini menyebabkan masing-masing cemas dan tertanya-tanya sesama sendiri. Beberapa minit kemudian kelihatan beberapa orang anggota polis dari Balai Polis Tanjong Malim datang. Ada yang masuk ke dalam Dewan Besar dan menutup pintu-pintu dewan tersebut. Kemudian diikuti oleh sepasukan askar, datang dan masuk ke dalam dewan. Ada di antara mereka yang terus ke tengah padang maktab yang luas itu. Mereka berlutut di sekeliling kawasan padang dengan menghala muncung senapang ke arah sekitar, seolah-olah bersiap sedia menghadapi pertempuran.
Tidak berapa lama kemudian, orang ramai datang dan mereka semuanya disuruh masuk ke dalam Dewan Besar. Sesiapa yang membawa senjata seperti pistol, keris, parang dan golok disuruh tinggalkan di muka pintu masuk Dewan Besar. Jumlahnya lebih kurang 300 orang yang terdiri daripada ketua-ketua kaum Melayu, Cina dan India, dan orang-orang kampung di sekitar Tanjong Malim. Selepas itu, datang sebuah trak tentera, di atas trak itu terbentang sehelai kain merah sebagai tanda ada sesuatu kecemasan. Trak itu berhenti di hadapan Dewan Besar, lalu keluar seorang pegawai tentera berpakaian seragam lengkap dengan sepucuk pistol di pinggangnya, beliau ialah General Sir Gerald Templer. Beliau masuk ke dalam dewan tempat orang ramai sedang menunggu lalu memberi ucapan dan memberitahu tentang tujuan kedatangannya.
Templer bercakap dengan nada marah, mengingatkan mereka bahawa dalam masa tiga bulan, pengganas-pengganas komunis telah melakukan banyak kekacauan dan keganasan di Tanjong Malim. Antara kekacauan yang dilakukan oleh pengganas komunis termasuklah sepuluh kejadian hendap terhadap pasukan polis dan tentera, lima buah lori telah dibakar, 6,000 pokok getah ditakik, tujuh pemogokan apabila buruh dihasut dan diugut, tiga buah bas dimusnahkan, lima kali serang hendap yang gagal di jalan raya, satu kejadian menggelincirkan kereta api, satu serangan terhadap sebuah kampung, dua saluran paip air dirosakkan dan 16 khemah komunis dijumpai oleh pasukan keselamatan. Dalam keganasan tersebut, lapan orang anggota polis terbunuh dan sembilan orang cedera.
Pengganas-pengganas komunis yang melakukan pembunuhan itu dipercayai masih berada di kawasan sekitar Tanjong Malim. Seterusnya beliau meminta supaya orang ramai memberi maklumat tentang kegiatan orang awam pula, tujuh orang mati dan dua cedera. Templer meminta orang ramai menolong menghapuskan pengganas-pengganas komunis yang sedang bermaharajalela di sekitar kawasan pengganas komunis di kawasan itu. Mereka juga diberi amaran keras supaya tidak terlibat membantu atau terpengaruh dengan dakyah-dakyah komunis. Sesiapa yang terlibat akan dikenakan hukuman tegas termasuk akan ditembak sampai mati. Selepas orang ramai dan penuntut diberi penerangan tentang keadaan semasa itu, mereka dibenarkan pulang.
Bagi memburu pengganas yang bertanggungjawab melakukan pembunuhan tersebut, penuntut-penuntut SITC yang menganggotai Home Guard telah turut terlibat membantu Inggeris membuat pemeriksaan dari rumah ke rumah. Pengenalan diri penduduk telah diperiksa satu persatu. Pegawai Daerah yang baru, D.C.L. Wilson telah dilantik dan beliau dibantu oleh pasukan polis dan tentera tambahan. Seorang majistret juga dilantik yang bertanggungjawab terhadap kesalahan melanggar perintah berkurung. Pekan Tanjong Malim juga dikenakan perintah berkurung selama 20 jam. Cuma empat jam sahaja mereka dibenarkan keluar iaitu dari jam 10.00 pagi hingga 2.00 petang untuk mendapatkan barang keperluan.
Catuan beras dikurangkan dari kira-kira 3 KG (5 kati) seorang seminggu kepada 1.81 KG (3 kati) bagi orang dewasa dan kira-kira 1.51 KG (2½ kati) bagi kanak-kanak. Tiada seorang pun yang dibenar meninggalkan pekan Tanjong Malim. Hukuman kolektif itu merangkumi setiap penduduk, lelaki, perempuan dan juga kanak-kanak di Tanjong Malim, di estet dan kampung yang menganjur dari Tanjong Malim hingga ke Trolak, kira-kira 18 batu ke arah utara. Sesiapa yang engkar dan melanggar perintah berkurung ini akan ditembak oleh askar-askar yang ditugaskan untuk menjaga kawasan tersebut.
Namun demikian, kelonggaran diberi kepada penternak lembu selama dua jam pada sebelah pagi untuk keluar memberi makanan kepada ternakan mereka. Ini memandangkan terdapat lebih kurang 50 orang penduduk Tanjong Malim keturunan India memelihara lembu. Semua sekolah ditutup dan perkhidmatan bas juga dihentikan. Pada masa yang sama, Keretapi Tanah Melayu menghentikan jualan tiket kereta api ke selatan yang melalui Tanjong Malim. Ini tentunya menyusahkan penuntut-penuntut SITC yang belajar kerana mereka tidak dapat pulang ke kampung masing-masing. Ibu bapa mereka juga tidak dapat membekalkan barang keperluan dan wang ringgit untuk perbelanjaan.
Dengan itu, hubungan Tanjong Malim dengan kawasan luar terputus. Sekatan ini dikekalkan sehingga penduduk membuktikan yang mereka bersedia bekerjasama dalam menghapuskan kawasan mereka daripada keganasan komunis. Pihak kerajaan berharap, sekatan dan kelaparan yang dialami oleh penduduk dapat menyebabkan mereka memberi maklumat kepada pihak berkuasa. Perkara ini dilaporkan oleh akhbar The Strait Times di bawah topik utama “Hungry Feeling Will Make Tanjong Malim Talk.” Ini kerana Gerald Templer percaya bahawa penduduk Tanjong Malim mengetahui tentang kegiatan pengganas komunis, tetapi takut untuk memberitahu kepada pihak kerajaan. Sekatan yang dikenakan amat menyusahkan kehidupan penuntut-penuntut SITC dan penduduk Tanjong Malim.
Sekatan yang dikenakan itu sememangnya menyusahkan kehidupan penduduk-penduduk Tanjong Malim. Sebahagian besar daripada kedai mempunyai tandas dan bilik air di luar kedai. Di bawah perintah berkurung, mereka tidak dapat menggunakan tandas dan bilik air kerana tidak dibenarkan keluar dari rumah. Kebebasan bergerak disekat dan kerja harian tidak dapat dilaksanakan seperti biasa. Mereka menghadapi kesusahan mendapatkan makanan dan mengalami tekanan perasaan. Penduduk tidak dapat keluar bekerja dan menyebabkan mereka kehilangan nafkah hidup. Penoreh getah, penternak lembu dan penjaja kehilangan punca pencarian. Ini adalah kali pertama di Tanah Melayu di mana sebuah pekan atau kawasan dihadkan makanan dengan tujuan untuk membuat penduduk memberi maklumat tentang kejadian keganasan komunis yang berlaku di kawasan itu.
Penduduk Tanjong Malim khasnya penuntut-penuntut SITC menderita kelaparan dan berdepan dengan kebuluran setelah 10 hari catuan beras dan perintah berkurung 22 jam dikenakan. Ramai penduduk mula merasa kepedihan akibat kelaparan dan kerugian dalam perniagaan sebanyak $100,000 dalam 10 hari perintah berkurung dikuatkuasakan. Sementara itu harga barangan keperluan melambung tinggi. Ada antara mereka bergadai apa saja sebagai cara memperoleh wang untuk membeli makanan.
Ketika bekalan air belum dipulihkan, penduduk yang selama ini menerima bekalan air paip terpaksa menggunakan air sungai dan menadah air hujan untuk memasak. Begitu juga dengan penuntut-penuntut SITC, bekalan air ke asrama mereka telah terputus menyebabkan mereka semua mandi-manda dan mendapatkan bekalan untuk minuman dari sungai Bernam. Keadaan di Tanjong Malim begitu daif dan penduduk pula bimbang keselamatan nyawa dan harta benda mereka.
Semasa perintah berkurung dikuatkuasakan, gerakan menyoal siasat sesiapa yang disyaki membantu atau menjadi agen pengganas komunis telah dilaksanakan. Pada 6 April 1952, pemerintah British mengedarkan kertas soal selidik yang ditulis dalam bahasa Melayu, Cina dan Tamil ke setiap rumah di Tanjong Malim. Mereka dikehendaki memberitahu nama-nama pengganas komunis yang tinggal di situ, kegiatan pengganas yang diketahui mereka, nama orang yang menolong memberi makanan atau menolong memberi wang dan lain-lain bantuan.
Demikian juga nama pemungut wang, ejen pengambilan rekrut dan yang menjadi tali barut komunis perlu diberitahu. Mereka dikehendaki menjawab soal selidik pada kertas yang disediakan. Kertas jawapan tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam sebuah peti yang disediakan, kemudiannya peti tersebut dibawa balik ke King House dan dibuka serta diperiksa sendiri oleh Sir Gerald Templer. Wakil penduduk Tanjong Malim, Abdul Rashid bin Abdul Wahab, Tan Boon Jin, Leong Gee, Alaudin (Ketua Kampung Simpang Ampat) dan seorang lagi wakil India dijemput hadir melihat Templer membuka peti soal selidik di Kuala Lumpur.
Kira-kira 2,000 surat yang mengandungi hal-hal rahsia mengenai pengganas komunis diterima daripada penduduk Tanjong Malim. Hasil daripada gerakan tersebut, kira-kira 40 orang Cina termasuk beberapa orang taukeh dan beberapa orang India yang disyaki menjadi utusan atau pembekal makanan kepada komunis telah ditangkap pada 7 April 1952 lalu dibawa ke Kuala Lumpur untuk disoal siasat. Di antara mereka, ada tiga orang yang terlibat secara langsung dalam kegiatan komunis.
Setelah maklumat diperolehi dan keadaan sekitar Tanjong Malim agak terkawal, pada 9 April 1952, perintah berkurung telah mula dilonggarkan sedikit, iaitu dari jam 7.00 petang hingga 6.00 pagi keesokan hari dan perintah berkurung rumah dari tengah malam hingga 5 pagi. Selepas hukuman tersebut, penduduk Tanjong Malim dikatakan telah bekerjasama dengan kerajaan. Kira-kira 3,500 penduduk Tanjong Malim dan penuntut SITC telah menyertai Home Guard untuk menjaga keamanan.
Dalam pada itu, pengganas komunis meningkatkan lagi keganasan mereka di beberapa kawasan seperti di Cameron Highlands, Perak, Johor dan Negeri Sembilan. Sehingga akhir November 1955, hanya 30 orang sahaja pengganas yang tampil dengan sukarela menyahut perisytiharan itu. Memandangkan keganasan yang kian merebak dan sambutan yang agak dingin terhadap tawaran pengampunan tersebut, maka kerajaan telah memansuhkan perisytiharan pengampunan ini pada 1 Disember 1955.
Kedegilan anggota-anggota PKM untuk bekerjasama dengan kerajaan telah menyebabkan pemerintahan darurat di Tanah Melayu berlarutan selama 12 tahun. Akhirnya pada 31 Julai 1960, Tanah Melayu diisytiharkan pulih dari bencana itu, setelah menanggung kerugian harta benda dan korban jiwa yang tidak ternilai.
Peristiwa yang diceritakan ini adalah sebahagian daripada penderitaan yang dialami oleh rakyat negara kita semasa zaman darurat akibat pemberontakan komunis. Perlukah kita menaruh simpati terhadap ‘musuh negara’ yang pernah memusnahkan masyarakat dan negara pada suatu ketika dahulu?
Sebenarnya, mangsa-mangsa kekejaman komunis kurang mendapat pembelaan berbanding dengan pihak komunis yang melakukan kekejaman. Buktinya, bekas anggota PKM hidup senang lenang dan mendapat segala kemudahan di Kampung Chulabhorn Patana, Naratiwat, Thailand. Malah kerajaan negara tersebut juga menyediakan tanah kepada mereka untuk bercucuk tanam dan sebagai tempat tinggal. Sebuah muzium yang dikenali sebagai Muzium Sejarah juga didirikan untuk tatapan ramai. Mereka sepatutnya terus tinggal di situ buat selama lamanya kerana negara ini tiada tempat buat pengkianat negara.